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TORT LIABILITY OF NONPROFIT
CORPORATIONS AND THEIR VOLUNTEERS,
DIRECTORS, AND OFFICERS: FOCUS ON
OKLAHOMA
I. INTRODUCTION
Much has been written about the tort liability problems of nonprofit corpo-
rations and their volunteers,' especially since the early 1980's, when liability
insurance became more expensive and harder to obtain.2 Despite increasing
interest in the issue, little solid data exists that would allow the actual impact of
tort liability to be quantified definitively.3 There has been some debate as to
whether the threat is one of substance or merely perception.4 Nonetheless, ef-
forts across the country have focused on reducing the liability exposure and the
financial burden of losses on individual volunteers and not-for-profit organiza-
tions From the point of view of nonprofit corporations, the liability question
is two-fold: (1) What is the liability of nonprofit corporations for the actions of
their volunteers? and (2) What is the personal liability of volunteers, directors,
and officers acting on behalf of these organizations? The answers to these ques-
tions are dependent upon sparse case law and the relevant statutory provisions
of the jurisdiction in which they are asked. Because few cases have been decid-
ed, and the analysis of the liability issue in each case is very fact specific, out-
comes are uncertain and costs are unpredictable.
This comment addresses the issues of personal and vicarious liability
which may be incurred by volunteers, directors, and officers of nonprofit corpo-
rations and by the corporate entity itself.6 It looks at ways the threat of liability
1. See Daniel L. Kurtz, Protecting Your Volunteer: The Efficacy Of Volunteer Protection Statutes And
Other Liability Limiting Devices, C726 ALI-ABA 263 (1992); David W. Hartmann, Volunteer Immunity:
Maintaining The Vitality Of The Third Sector Of Our Economy, 10 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REv. 63 (1989);
Jeffrey D. Kahn, Comment, Organizations' Liability For Torts Of Volunteers, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1433
(1985); Charles Robert Tremper, Compensation For Harm From Charitable Activity, 76 CORNELL L. REV.
401 (1991).
2. See Symposium: Issues In Tort Reform: Making Sense Of The Liability Insurance Crisis, 48 OHIO
ST. LJ. 399 (1987).
3. See Tremper, supra note 1, at 405-06 & n.22.
4. See Kurtz, supra note 1, at 292 (quoting a Justice Department official at the ABA's 1991 annual
meeting, "much of the volunteer protection effort is focused on 'perception,' not substance").
5. See id.; Hartmann, supra note 1; Kahn, supra note 1.
6. One issue of concern to those who serve on and advise nonprofit boards of directors is the "responsi-
ble person" liability for Federal and state taxes of the organization. This area becomes particularly problematic
when an officer or director has check-signing authority but where the compensated executive director of the
organization makes all payroll and employee decisions. The IRS' aggressive pursuit of volunteer board mem-
bers of economically-failed nonprofit organizations has heightened this concern. This issue is not addressed in
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negatively impacts volunteers and nonprofits. It then proceeds to review statuto-
ry efforts and other means of controlling tort liability. The bulk of the article
focuses on the personal liability of volunteers, directors, and officers and the
vicarious liability of nonprofit corporations under Oklahoma law, highlighting
recently enacted tort reforms. The article culminates with recommendations for
managing the risk of utilizing volunteers for Oklahoma's nonprofit corporations.
II. VOLUNTEERISM AND NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS
"Americans of all ages, all stations in life, and all types of disposition, are
forever forming associations... Nothing, in my view, deserves more attention
than the intellectual and moral associations in America."7 When he visited this
country during the 1830's, Alexis de Tocqueville was struck by the American
propensity to associate, to come together for a variety of purposes. This willing-
ness to exchange ideas, to work toward common goals, and to volunteer in the
service of others is part of our history,' our social institutions,9 and our system
of government. °
Traditionally, Americans formed small, local groups in their communi-
ties. 1 Though membership in civic associations has diminished over the last
generation," nonprofit organizations, especially nonprofit service agencies,
have become increasingly prominent. 3 Through these organizations, "volun-
teers donate their time and energy to such fields as social service, the arts,
parks and recreation, health care, justice, religion, education, agriculture, and
politics."'4 Though there is great diversity in the purposes and structures of
these organizations, they have common characteristics: they are voluntarily
formed, and they depend upon volunteers for the labor and creativity needed to
accomplish their goals.' Additionally, "nonprofit organizations are not moti-
vated to maximize profits[,] ''16 they avoid private inurement by "refraining
from distributing [any] profits to private parties[,]"' 7 and "they do not recoup
the monetary value of the benefits they produce[.]"'
this article.
7. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMoCRACY IN AMERICA 513-17, J.P. Maier, ed. & George Lawrence,
trans. (Anchor Books 1969), cited in Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital,
6 No. 1 JOURNAL oF DEMOCRACY 65, 65-66 (1995).
8. See Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone, Revisited, THE RESPONSIVE COMMUNrY, Spring 1995, at 18.
9. See id.
10. See id. at 19.
11. See Putnam, supra note 7, at 71.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. Kahn, supra note 1, at 1433.
15. See Hartmann, supra note 1, at 72-73 (quoting testimony of Senator John Melcher at a Senate Hear-
ing on the volunteer Protection Act of 1989, H.R. 911, "This country depends on volunteers to make things
work, from town councils, libraries, school boards, fire departments, and hospital boards, to scout troops and
little league baseball teams.").
16. Developments In The Law-Nonprofit Corporations, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1579, 1693 (1992).
17. Tremper, supra note 1, at 459.
18. Developments, supra note 16, at 1692.
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A variety of labels have been applied to this growing segment of our econ-
omy, i.e., the independent sector, 9 the third sector,' and the voluntary sec-
tor.2 ' Whatever it is called,
[i]f it were to disappear from our national life, we would be less distinctly
American. Its vitality is rooted in good soil--civic pride, compassion, a
philanthropic tradition, a strong problem-solving impulse, a sense of indi-
vidual responsibility and, despite what cynics may say, an irrepressible
commitment to the great shared task of improving our life together. '
One of the most distinctive and commendable features of our society,
volunteerism embodies a profoundly important concept-namely that a
good citizen of a decent society has a personal responsibility to serve the
needs of others. In that simple age-old proposition lies the essential dis-
tinction between a brutalizing society and a caring and responsible one.'
Volunteerism's contribution to American life defies accurate measurement, as
does the number of individuals who volunteer their time and services. Time and
Newsweek magazines conducted surveys indicating that more than 80 million
Americans are engaged in volunteering.24 Another nationwide survey said
about half of the population renders volunteer services each year.'
Encouraging volunteerism and the effective functioning of nonprofit orga-
nizations is an essential policy goal for two reasons. First, many individuals
derive psychological, social and physical health benefits from the social contract
inherent in volunteering.' Second, our society needs the services thus provid-
ed, some at reduced cost or free of charge to the beneficiariesY A sort of part-
nership exists between government and nonprofits because of shared missions,
and legislatively-mandated programs may be carried out by these groups under
government grants or contracts.' These organizations fill gaps and meet needs
for which no broad base of support exists.29 In addition, "private nonprofit
institutions-because of their strong constituencies and their tradition of inde-
pendence-are an important check upon the excesses of government and a cor-
rective to some of its worst deficiencies."
But, no matter how altruistic the intentions of nonprofit organizations3'
19. See John W. Gardner, The Independent Sector, in AMERCA'S VOLUNTARY Sprr ix, xiii-xv (Brian
O'Connell, ed. 1983), reprinted in JAMES J. FISHmAN AND STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS:
CASES AND MATERmALS 3 [hereinafter FlsHmAN & SCHWARZ ](1995).
20. See Waldemar A. Nielsen, The Third Sector: Keystone CfA Caring Society, in AMERICA'S VOLUN-
TARY SPIRIT (Brian O'Connell, ed. 1983), at 360-369, reprinted in FISHMAN & ScHWARz, supra note 19, at 5.
21. See Gardner, supra note 19.
22. Id. at 5.
23. Nielsen, supra note 20, at 8.
24. See R.W. McMenamin, The Volunteer And Liability: Words To The Wise For Those Who Use Volun-
teers-And Those Who Counsel Them, 55-JAN OR. ST. B. BuLL. 15 (1995).
25. See Tremper, supra note 1, at 410.
26. See Kahn, supra note 1, at 1436.
27. See generally Tremper, supra note 1.
28. See id. at 408.
29. See Lester M. Salarnon, America's Nonprofit Sector: A Primer, reprinted in FIsHMAN & SCHWARZ,
supra note 19, at 7-9.
30. Nielsen, supra note 20, at 7.
31. See Avner Ben-Ner, Who Benefits From The Nonprofit Sector? Reforming Law And Public Policy
1997]
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and their volunteers, their actions may cause harm to others, however inadver-
tently. Historically, the charitable immunity doctrine protected charitable organi-
zations from tort liability,32 but "allowed plaintiffs to recover damages from
volunteers and other employees of those organizations."33 However, beginning
with the 1940's, case law and a few state statutes began to erode the doctrine.
By 1992, it was virtually abrogated by almost all of the states.34 In the absence
of the charitable immunity exemption from tort liability, the doctrine of respon-
deat superior applies,35 making nonprofit organizations potentially liable for
the torts of their volunteers in much of the same manner that employers can be
vicariously liable for their employees' actions.36
The imposition of vicarious liability was intended to encourage nonprofits
to take precautions against causing injuriesY The blanket immunity of the
charitable immunity doctrine was considered undesirable in so far as it failed to
deter risky and harmful behavior and denied compensation to those injured.
The increase in well-funded and socially-potent nonprofit organizations helped
to undercut the public's support for blanket immunity,39 as did the publicity
given the wrongdoings of several large nonprofits.' Because inexpensive lia-
bility insurance was available,4' it was believed that these organizations could
procure financial protection for the organization and for its volunteers.
By the 1980's, several developments fueled nonprofits' fears about tort
liability: the general expansion of tort liability42 (including large judgments and
settlements obtained by plaintiffs in highly publicized cases against nonprofits);
an increase in personal liability (evidenced by a "marked increase in the number
of suits against individuals acting for nonprofit organizations");43 and changes
in the availability and cost of liability insurance for nonprofits.
Though there has been considerable disagreement as to the causes of the
so-called "liability insurance crisis,"" there is agreement that increased rates
and restricted coverage reduced the ability of nonprofit organizations to obtain
affordable liability insurance.4' It seems clear that, in addition to other contrib-
Towards Nonprofit Organizations, 104 YALE L. 731 (1994)(book review).
32. See Kurtz, supra note 1, at 292; Kahn, supra note 1, at 1436-37.
33. Kurtz, supra note 1, at 266 (citing President of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 814
(D.C. Cir. 1942), as the beginning of the end for the charitable immunity doctrine).
34. See Kurtz, supra note 1, at 267; see also Developments, supra note 15, at 1683.
35. See Kahn, supra note 1, at 1437 n.29 (for list of cases decided under the doctrine of respondeat
superior).
36. See id. at 1433.
37. See id. at 1437.
38. See Developments, supra note 16, at 1683.
39. See Kurtz, supra note 1.
40. See Ben-Ner, supra note 31, at 733 & n.ll (for a list of accounts about nonprofit scandals).
41. See Kurtz, supra note 1, at 267.
42. See id. at 268.
43. Developments, supra note 16, at 1681.
44. See Symposium, supra note 2, at 399; see also Kurtz, supra note 1, at 268 (Ralph Nader, among
others, attributed higher insurance premiums to "a slump in the insurance market, not an increase in litiga-
tion."); Tremper, supra note 1, at 402 & n.5 (1991) (suits "attracted substantial media attention"; for examples
of high-profile lawsuits against nonprofits and volunteers).
45. Developments, supra note 16, at 1681.
[Voel. 33:683
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uting factors, the uncertainty of outcomes in the tort system created greater
financial risk for nonprofits and insurers and higher rates for liability insurance
for nonprofit organizations, their directors and officers, and their volunteers.'
Proposed solutions have run the gamut, calling for everything from insurance
industry modifications to tort reform at the state level and federal volunteer im-
munity legislation.
m. THE THREAT OF TORT LiAmrry
A. In general
The fact is that few nonprofits, and even fewer volunteers, are sued.' A
1988 Gallup survey concluded that "while there is a great deal of concern for
the risk of liability, only one in twenty organizations report being sued on a
directors and officers liability questions in the past five years."'49 Insurance
claims experience indicates that losses sustained by nonprofit organizations are
below average and that claims against volunteers are rare.50 Nonetheless, non-
profit organizations may not be able to absorb the costs incurred by accidental
injury, or they may feel it is their duty to expend their donors' funds for the
purposes they intended, not for tort costs.5 ' "Many nonprofit organizations
have reported that the threat of complete financial ruin created by the specter of
personal liability has dissuaded individuals from contributing their services." '52
It is the uncertainty that worries nonprofits and their directors, officers, and
volunteers about their "susceptibility to," or potential for, exposure5 It's the
uncertainty created by a very few high profile damage awards against nonprofit
corporations and their volunteers that cause them to curtail their activities and
services rather than expand them for the benefit of their communities. The
expense of legal defense, the disruption of services, and the public relations
effect of negative publicity from being sued can be enormous, even if neither
the organization nor its volunteers are found liable for the damage or injury
claimed when they ultimately get their "day in court."
If the specter of liability really interferes with individual altruistic proclivi-
ties and with the scope and variety of services provided by nonprofit corpora-
tions, the protections afforded by Oklahoma law bear scrutiny. Currently, the
legal climate falls to inspire confidence and encourage the growth of this sector
46. See Symposium, supra note 2, at 405.
47. See id. at 399; Kurtz, supra note 1, at 263; Tremper, supra note 1.
48. See Kurtz, supra note I, at 292.
49. Id. at 269.
50. See Tremper, supra note 1, at 414.
51. See Developments, supra note 16, at 1692 ("[N]onprofit organizations may have to avoid activities
that have even minimal accident costs, despite the fact that the overall benefits to be gained from such activi-
ties might greatly outweigh the harms .... Moreover, requiring nonprofit "organizations to internalize all of
their accident costs through full liability will drive them out of business even though they produce a net bene-
fit for society.").
52. Developments, supra note 16, at 1692.
53. See Tremper, supra note 1, at 412-17.
1997]
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at a time when nonprofits are being increasingly called upon to augment or
replace social services, support education, and provide art and cultural program-
ming in the face of declining government funding.'
B. Cases
Two recent cases give credence to the concerns expressed by nonprofit
organizations and volunteers.
1. Powell v. Boy Scouts of America, No. 9208 05390 (Multnomah Cty.
Cir. Ct. Portland, Ore. Feb. 14, 1994). 5
Two volunteers on a Sea Scout outing were found liable for negligent
supervision of six teenage Scouts when one was accidentally rendered quadri-
plegic in a pickup tackle football game with other Scouts. The Boy Scouts
obtained summary judgment on a respondeat superior claim because they did
not have direct control over the volunteers, and they received a directed verdict
on the claim that they failed adequately to instruct the volunteers.56 The jury
found that the volunteers and the plaintiff were contributorily negligent, and
awarded $7,032,917 in damages. Oregon has a $500,000 statutory cap on non-
economic damages, so the jury award of $2,141,942 in non-economic damages
will be reduced accordingly. Because the volunteers were covered under the
Boy Scouts' insurance policy, the plaintiff will recover from the Scouts' liabili-
ty insurer.57
It is verdicts like this and an earlier one against the Boy Scouts in Albany
that have caused organizations that use volunteers to reassess the adequacy of
their liability insurance coverage."
2. Craig v. Canterbury Soccer Club, No. E-0495 (Fulton Cty. Super. Ct.
Ga. March 4, 1994)."9
This case involved a ten-year-old goalie in an organized youth soccer game
who was injured by a "homemade" portable soccer goal, weighing 175 pounds,
which fell on the plaintiff's face. Liability was attributed to the failure of the
soccer club's members to anchor the goal to the ground by means of steel pins
when it was moved during practice. The defendant soccer club claimed that the
goal would not have overturned if the boy had not been swinging or hanging on
it. Further, the club claimed it was impossible to insure that all the goals were
properly anchored at all times because the soccer facility was so large.
54. See Kahn, supra note 1, at 1433.
55. Recreational Organizations: Jury Finds Boy Scout Volunteers Liable For Negligent Supervision, 14
No. 4 VERDICTS, SETraMETs & TACTICS 138 (1994).
56. See id. at 139.
57. See id.
58. McMenamin, supra note 24 at 15.
59. Recreational Organizations: Settlement In Suit Arising From Injury Sustained By Child When Soccer
Goal Posts Fell Over, 14 No. 4 VERDIcrs, SEr.LEmENTs & TACTICS 138, 139 (1994).
[Vol. 33:683
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The boy's face was bruised and lacerated and he experienced dizziness and
headaches. He also claimed problems concentrating on his schoolwork as a
result of the accident. Despite the fact that the injured boy's CT scans revealed
no brain injuries and that his neurological examinations were normal, the soccer
club settled with the boy's family in the amount of $340,000. °
IV. CONTROLLING TORT LIABILrrY
A. Liability insurance
"The possibility of liability deters individuals from volunteering to serve as
officers, directors or other workers of exempt or governmental organizations
(such as local charities or city commissions)."6' To remedy this, nonprofit or-
ganizations often provide directors' and officers' liability insurance or other
liability insurance to protect its volunteers' personal assets. Directors and offi-
cers (D&O) insurance, or errors and omissions coverage, insures against costs
and losses associated with being sued for the actions of board members. Poli-
cies make direct payments to covered officers and directors, when they are not
protected by the corporate indemnity, and reimburse the organization for any
indemnification payments to directors and officers.'
1. Alternatives
The states' efforts have neither successfully lowered liability insurance
costs, nor quieted the fears of would-be volunteers. Immunity from tort liability
fails to deter risky or harmful behavior on the part of nonprofit organizations
and their volunteers, therefore consequent accident costs are imposed on indi-
vidual tort victims. These problems point to a need to continue looking for tort
solutions. The goals of preserving the deterrence and loss-spreading functions of
the tort system, while providing a secure source of recovery for persons who
are accidentally injured by the activities of nonprofit organizations, have
spawned some creative solutions.
a. "Accident-cost subsidies"6
"Accident-cost subsidies" have been proffered as one means of easing the
financial burden on nonprofits of acquiring liability insurance. This scheme
purports to "link advantageous tort treatment to an organization's production of
60. See id.
61. See Lawrence A. Jegen I, Certain Fringe Benefits to Volunteers Are Nontaxable, 37 RES GESTAE
126, 126 (1993) (describing a recent IRS regulation which appears to exclude liability insurance provided to
volunteers by exempt or governmental organizations from taxable fringe benefits. "The possibility of the value
of those fringe benefits being treated as gross income would be a further deterrent to those who would serve
as volunteers.").
62. See Daniel L. Kurtz, The Duties and Liabilities of Officers and Directors, Including a Review of
Indemnification and Insurance, 307 PLI/TAX 431, 480-81 (1990).
63. Developments, supra note 16, at 1693.
1997]
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external benefits." This tort solution would differentiate between nonprofits
based upon the extent to which they "gratuitously transfer to others... the
value of what they produce." State governments would enable charitable and
philanthropic nonprofits to buy private liability insurance by providing direct
financial grants to the organizations for that purpose, or by underwriting state-
wide nonprofit insurance pools. The extent to which their accident costs are
underwritten would be determined by the degree to which the organizations'
activities provide a benefit to the society. The major problem, admitted by the
author of this proposal, is the practical difficulty of measuring the precise level
of "externalized benefits" produced by nonprofits for the purpose of apportion-
ing accident-cost subsidies to them.'
b. Exculpatory agreements
Another proposed solution advocates employing exculpatory agreements,
releases, or waivers, in the form of contracts, to exculpate volunteers of non-
profit corporations from potential tort liability. It has been suggested that these
agreements of express assumptions of risk could be especially useful to reduce
volunteer liability in youth activities that involve some degree of risk for injury.
The proponent is motivated by fear that growing concerns about volunteer tort
liability may create a climate where there "will be no supervised youth activi-
ties and greatly reduced opportunities for meaningful contact with caring
adults."67 The author's thesis is "that the supposed benefits of tort liability are
outweighed by the costs, and that such liability is counterproductive when im-
posed on volunteers in organized youth activities." Exculpatory agreements
entered into by the parents of the young participants would allow recovery for
accidental injuries sustained by their children through first-party health and
disability insurance and government-supported medical care.69 It is not contem-
plated that these agreements would exculpate intentional injuries. Prevailing
judicial attitudes toward these agreements have generally not been favorable, so
legislative approval in the form of statutory authorization would be necessary to
effectively use these devices to bar tort claims against volunteers and nonprofit
organizations.7 °
B. Statutory protection
Statutory protection basically takes three forms: (1) indemnification; (2)
limited liability or partial immunity for nonprofit organizations; or (3) immunity
from personal liability for volunteers, directors and officers.
64. Id. at 1692.
65. Id.
66. See id. at 1694.
67. Joseph H. King, Jr., Exculpatory Agreements For Volunteers In Youth Activities--The Alternative To
"Nerf(Reg. TM.)" Tiddlywinks, 53 OHiO ST. L. J. 683, 684 (1992).
68. Id. at 685.
69. See id. at 749.
70. See id. at 759.
[Vol. 33:683
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1. Indemnification for individuals
Indemnification provides directors and officers with financial protection
against expenses and liabilities incurred in connection with actual or threatened
legal proceedings arising as a result of their service to the organization. The
provisions generally encompasses the expenses and costs not covered by D&O
insurance, including fines, penalties, punitive damage awards, and the cost of
investigative matters. The majority of state indemnification statutes are based on
the 1969 Model Business Corporation Act. A number of nonprofit indemnifica-
tion statutes follow the act; others have singular provisions or none at all!'
Indemnification statutes may be mandatory, providing full protection against a
successful director's defense costs; or permissive, by inclusion in charters or
by-laws or by contract. Indemnification may or may not cover third-party or
derivative actions.
Oklahoma's indemnification statute' gives corporations the power to in-
demnify "officers, directors, employees and agents ... against expenses, includ-
ing attorneys' fees .... in connection with the defense or settlement of" any
legal actions that arise "by reason of the fact that he [or she] was a director,
officer, employee or agent of the corporation." ' The provision applies only if
the defending party "acted in good faith and in a manner he reasonably believed
to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation."
The fact remains, however, that these issues would have to be litigated,
and in doing so, considerable legal expenses would be incurred. These costs are
subject to substantial deductibles, so they are rarely paid in full, and the list of
claims not covered has expanded significantly.76 "The real problem facing
nonprofits is their lack of resources which make both the risk of 'going bare'
and the alternatives to insurance unpromising."
2. Liability limitations for nonprofit organizations
In some states, new statutes were enacted to provide some degree of pro-
tection to nonprofits, and, in others, case law retains vestiges of old charitable
immunity rules. Imposing statutory caps or limits on damages is another way
states have limited tort costs for nonprofits.78
The proposed Charitable Redress System (CRS)79 affords "prompt pay-
ment of unreimbursed pecuniary losses to a greater number of injured parties"
71. See Kurtz, supra note 62, at 469.
72. See id.
73. OKLA. STAT. it. 18, § 1031 (1991).
74. OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1031(B) (1991).
75. Id.
76. Kurtz, supra note 62, at 481-83.
77. Id. at 486-87.
78. See McMenamin, supra note 24 at 15 (damage caps or limits tend to benefit nonprofit organiza-
tions).
79. Tremper, supra note 1, at 404.
19971
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than does the tort system." It responds more quickly to the financial needs of
an injured person, "reduc[ing] uncertainty in the recovery process and
preserv[ing] a larger share of charitable resources for public benefit."'" This
proposal resembles the states' workers' compensation systems, relying upon
"first-party insurance as the primary mechanism for compensating individuals
injured by charitable organizations."'82 By promptly making a standard form
legal offer to pay specified economic losses and settlement costs (extending a
CRS offer), many tort claims could be settled under this modified offer of judg-
ment scheme without litigation. The organization, employees, and volunteers
would be protected from non-economic losses and further liability to the injured
party. 3 Punitive damages would not be available for unintentional injuries.8 4
Implementing the CRS proposal would require the modification of state
insurance regulations in order to allow the victim's insurance to pay first, on a
no-fault basis, for its insured's accident costs and for the organization's insurer
to compensate for those "losses in excess of the victim's insurance benefits."'
Organizations that qualify for inclusion in the CRS would include those that
produce public benefits, operate for community betterment, and refrain from
private inurement of profits.86
Oklahoma's offer of judgment procedure takes one step in this direction,
providing for the shifting of attorney fees and costs after an offer of judgment
is made, assuming the offer is rejected and a trial court renders a judgment that
is less than the offer previously made.'
3. Immunity for volunteers
In 1985, Congress considered, but did not pass, the Volunteer Protection
Act.88 In 1989, President Bush introduced the Model State Volunteer Service
Act in his "Points of Light" address. 9 Both acts urged states to pass statutes
shielding volunteers from liability.' ° Congressman John Porter (R-Ill.), among
other politicians, volunteer rights coalitions, and lobbyists, pressed for this
legislation that would immunize volunteers from negligence liability.9'
Many states have enacted some kind of statutory immunity from personal
80. Id. at 444.
81. Id. at 445.
82. Id.
83. See id. at 446.
84. See id. at 447.
85. Id. at 451.
86. See id. at 459.
87. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 1101.1 (B) (West 1996).
88. See Kurtz, supra note 1, at 270-72 (The Volunteer Protection Act offered an incentive in the form of
a 1% increase in Federal Social Services Block Grant funds to the states who adopted legislation that com-
plied with the bill.).
89. See id. at 270.
90. See Developments, supra note 16, at 1686-87; Kurtz, supra note 1, at 270-71 (Both the Model State
Volunteer Act and the Volunteer Protection Act proposed a good faith standard for actions within the scope of
duties for the nonprofit organization, and excluded willful and wanton misconduct.).
91. See Kurtz, supra note 1, at 269-70.
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liability for individuals affiliated with nonprofit corporations.' These statutes
vary widely in scope and coverage, but discrimination, antitrust, and hazing
generally constitute unprotected conduct.' Two examples of the diversity of
these statutory limitations on liability are found in Kansas and Georgia.
Kansas immunizes volunteers if the nonprofit organization they serve car-
ries general liability insurance coverage, providing there is no willful or wanton
misconduct.94 Neither the state code nor the insurance industry specifies the
type or amount of liability insurance required. What is necessary to limit the
personal civil liability of its volunteer directors and officers is maintaining
"general-liability insurance coverage sufficient to cover the organization's activ-
ities."'95 Kansas provides additional safeguards for directors and officers of
incorporated nonprofits by allowing the inclusion of indemnification provisions
in the articles of incorporation.'
Georgia provides "public and private school volunteers with immunity
from tort liability... for acts or omissions that occur either on school property
or at a school-sponsored function" by an enactment that took effect on July
1, 1993.98
V. THE STATE OF THE LAW IN OKLAHOMA
A. Personal liability
1. Volunteers
Volunteers can incur personal liability for their own actions, and they can
incur vicarious liability for their organizations by virtue of their volunteer
work." Most of the questions about individual volunteer liability are answered
by the third part of Oklahoma's 1995 Tort Reform Law." ° The volunteer im-
munity statute,"' defines three important terms: "volunteer, .... charitable orga-
nization," and "not-for-profit corporation." A "volunteer" is a person who pro-
vides a service or other benefit of the person's "own free will without compen-
sation... in money or other thing of value. ''""a A "charitable organization"
includes groups, associations, "or any other person performing or purporting to
perform acts beneficial to the public."'0 3 A "not-for-profit corporation" is a
92. See Developments, supra note 16, at 1685.
93. See id. at 1686.
94. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3601 (1994); Charles Engel, Personal Liability Of Nonprofit Directors, 60-
MAY J. KAN. B.A. 28, 31 (1991).
95. Engel, supra note 94, at 31.
96. Id. at 32.
97. Laura Jones French, General Provisions: Provide Immunity from Liability for School Volunteers, 11
GA. ST. U. L. REv. 267 (1997).
98. Ga. Code Ann. §51-1-30.3 (Supp. 1997).
99. See McMenamin, supra note 24, at 17.
100. 1995 Okla. Sess. Laws 287.
101. OKLA. STAT. tit. 76, § 31 (Supp. 1995).
102. OKLA. STAT. tit. 76, § 31(D)(1) (Supp. 1995).
103. OKLA. STAT. tit. 76, § 31(D)(2) (Supp. 1995).
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corporation "formed for a purpose not involving pecuniary gain to its share-
holders or members, paying no dividends or other pecuniary remuneration ....
and having no capital stock.""'
The statute grants immunity from civil liability to volunteers of charitable
organizations and not-for-profit corporations,"°5 as long as the volunteers act
in good faith, within the scope of their official functions and duties, and do not
cause damage or injury by gross negligence or willful and wanton miscon-
duct.'" The immunity provided does not affect liability arising "from the op-
eration of a motor vehicle, water craft, or aircraft in rendering the service...
as a volunteer."'" Immunity is not conferred "to any person for actions taken
by the volunteer prior to or after the rendering of the service... ,,""
Oklahoma's volunteer immunity statute specifically states, "the doctrine of
respondeat superior shall apply."'" This leaves nonprofits wondering what be-
havior is lik&ly to be classified as within the scope of official functions and
duties of their volunteers." 0 As yet, no cases have been decided in this juris-
diction which would interpret the statute. As such, nonprofit corporations must
look to corporate law for its corollary definitions and interpretations. The
"scope of employment" inquiry has long been a key factor in determining
whether an employer is vicariously liable for the actions of an employee."'
Though it may be true that "it should not be assumed that all nonprofit corpora-
tion problems fit neatly into the business corporate paradigm,"' 12 nonprofit
corporation law has no greater analogous model.'
2. Directors and officers
The risk of liability of directors and officers is actually quite remote, but
an unfavorable outcome is potentially disastrous due to the lack of material
rewards in volunteer service." 4 Under Oklahoma's director immunity stat-
104. OKLA. STAT. tit. 76, § 31(D)(3) (Supp. 1995).
105. See Charles W. Adams, Recent Developments In Oklahoma Law-Civil Procedure, 31 TULSA U.
753, 763 (1996) ("Since a plaintiff will ordinarily be looking to the employer for compensation, the immunity
that the statute confers on the volunteer is unlikely to have any significant effect.").
106. See id.
107. OKLA. STAT. tit. 76, § 31(E) (Supp. 1995).
108. OKLA. STAT. tit. 76, § 31(F) (Supp. 1995).
109. OKLA. STAT. tit. 76, § 31 (B) (Supp. 1995).
110. McMenamin, supra note 24, at 17 ("For some reason, jurors seem prone to find that any volunteer
who causes harm to a person is acting in some way for the organization, and this makes the organization
liable for the acts of the volunteer.").
111. See Roring v. Hoggard, 326 P.2d 812, 813 (Okla. 1958), quoted in Haco Drilling Co., Inc. v.
Burchette, 364 P.2d 674, 677 (Okla. 1961) ("it is not essential to liability by the master that the servant be
entitled to compensation for his work at the time of the action causing the damage; it is enough to render the
master liable if the person causing the injury was in fact rendering service for him by his consent, express or
implied.").
112. See FIsHMAN & ScHwARz, supra note 19, at 151.
113. See infra notes 172-83 and accompanying text.
114. McMenamin, supra note 24, at 16 ("Unfortunately, personal liability can be incurred by the board
member for such things as unpaid tax withholding, mismanagement and perhaps improper spending of solicit-
ed funds .... ).
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ute," s directors and officers are not "personally liable for damages resulting
from: "1. any negligent act or omission of an employee... ; or 2. any neg-
ligent act or omission of another director ."".6 A director's intentional torts or
grossly negligent acts or omissions are not covered."7 Section 867 ...confers
immunity from:
monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty'19 as a director, provid-
ing that such immunity from liability shall not extend to: 1. any breach of
the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation; or 2. any acts or omis-
sions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a
knowing violation of the law; or 3. any transaction from which the direc-
tor derived an improper personal benefit."as
Basically, directors and officers incur liability when they breach any of the
duties which they owe their organizations by virtue of their positions.'' These
duties include: (1) the duty of obedience to the purposes or "mission" of the
organization;' (2) a duty of care to discharge duties in good faith" "with
the necessary diligence and informed decision-making expected of a board of
directors;"' 4 and (3) the duty of loyalty, which prohibits direct distributions to
directors and officers and requires close scrutiny of potential conflict of interest
transactions."s
B. Vicarious liability
1. The doctrine of respondeat superior
Ascertaining the vicarious liability of nonprofits is a more complicated
endeavor. The controlling principle is that the master is liable for torts commit-
ted by the servant,"ss regardless of the fault of the master."z Three condi-
tions must be met before liability can be imposed under the doctrine of respon-
115. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 866 (1991).
116. OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 866(A) (1991). See subsection (C) for a further prohibition against the transfer
of corporate assets to a director in order to allow the corporation to avoid paying a judgment.
117. See OKLA. STAT. fit. 18, § 866(B) (1991).
118. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 867 (1991).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See Kurtz, supra note 62, at 459-60.
122. See id. (noting that the duty of obedience is predicated upon the belief that donors have a right to
rely on an organization's faithfulness to its purpose, the duty of obedience includes an obligation to conduct
activities lawfully and to comply with the law).
123. Id. at 3. See also FISHMAN & ScHwARz, supra note 19, at 161 ("The business judgment rule pro-
vides that directors shall not be liable for harm to the corporation of exercise of their judgment so long as
they exercised care. The protection of the business judgment rule will only apply in the absence of fraud,
illegality, or a disabling conflict of interest.").
124. Id. at 160 (noting that generally, the business judgment rule provides immunity for judgments that
have a plausible basis of rationality, involve no conflict of interests, and are reasonably informed. There is
little practical difference from applying a gross negligence standard of conduct.).
125. See Kurtz, supra note 62, at 450-51 (Disclosure of material facts of the proposed transactions and
the nature of the conflict is required. The case law superimposes a fairness standard.).
126. See RESTATBMNT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1957). See also Kahn, supra note 1, at 1438 n.31.
127. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND KEEroN ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 501-02 (5th ed.
1984). See also Kahn, supra note 1, at 1438.
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deat superior. (1) there must have been an injury caused by the servant's negli-
gence; (2) there must be a master-servant relationship; and (3) the servant must
have been acting within the scope of employment when the injury occurred."
The first element must be established before any respondeat superior inquiry
becomes relevant. Once legally cognizable harm and causation are determined,
an employer is vicariously liable only if the defendant employee was acting
within the scope of his or her employment at the time the employee caused
harm to the plaintiff. 9
A master-servant relationship also must be shown to exist "at the time and
in respect to the very transaction out of which the injury arose"' before the
employer can be vicariously liable.13' In theory, if the employer consents to
receiving the employee's services, expects some benefit from them, and retains
the right to control the physical conduct of the employee, it is likely that a valid
master-servant relationship will be found to exist.3
2
The part of the equation that is hardest to resolve is the issue of right-to-
control.' The court in Tulsa County v. Braswell"3 restated the holding from
Clark v. First Baptist Church,'35 that "[a]lthough several factors may be con-
sidered in determining whether an employee-employer relationship exists be-
tween two parties the most crucial factor is whether the employer was in pos-
session of the right to control and supervise the employee's work."'36 In
reaching its decision that Tulsa county had the right to control and supervise
employees of the county election board, the Braswell court found factors perti-
nent to hiring and supervision determinative. The employees were included in
the county's group health insurance program and retirement system, and were
subject to the county's policies on annual and sick leave accrual. The county
also recruited and screened all election board employees. All these were con-
sidered methods of controlling the employees. 37
The analysis of right-to-control is fact specific and not clear-cut, as reason-
able minds can disagree as to what constitutes control and the degree of control
necessary to find it present. The rule stated in Ries v. Cartwright'38 is
128. See Kahn, supra note 1, at 1441-43.
129. See id. at 1439-40.
130. See Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Carsten, 55 P.2d 757 (Okla. 1936). See also Ellis & Lewis, Inc. v.
Trimble, 57 P.2d 244, 245 (Okla. 1936) (for definitive elements to be considered in determining whether the
nature of the relationship between parties is master-servant); Keith v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 272
P.2d 371, 376 (Okla. 1954).
131. See Kahn, supra note 1, at 1440-42.
132. Robert L Winter, Rodebush: Finding the Road to Strict Liability for the Intentional Torts of Employ-
ees, 30 TULSA L. J. 375, 393 & n.56 (1994) ("Mhe law has consistently used the employer's power over the
employee as the ultimate justification for liability."). See also Kahn, supra note 1, at 1440 (noting that the
application to the volunteer situation has proven problematic in jurisdictions which have analyzed it).
133. See, e.g., Nelson v. Pollay, 916 P.2d 1369 (Okla. 1996); Texaco, Inc. v. Layton, 395 P.2d 393 (Okla.
1964); Keith v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 272 P.2d 371 (Okla. 1954).
134. 766 P.2d 341 (Okla. 1988).
135. 570 P.2d 327, 329 (Okla. 1977).
136. Tulsa County, 766 P.2d at 342.
137. See id. at 343.
138. 297 P.2d 367 (Okla. 1956).
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"[w]here the evidence is conflicting or where reasonable men may differ in
conclusions therefrom, the issue of master and servant or of principal and agent
is one of fact for determination by the jury.' 1 39
2. The scope of employment
The difficulty lies in determining whether an employee's tortuous actions
fall within the scope of employment necessary to support a claim under respon-
deat superior. The court in Nelson v. Pollay"' stated that "[u]nder the doctrine
of respondeat superior a principal or employer is generally held liable for those
acts of an agent or employee which fall within the latter's employment or au-
thority. This rule rests on the premise that, when exercising delegated authority,
the employee stands under the complete control of the employer."'
4
'
Since Ada-Konawa Bridge Co. v. Cargo42 was decided in 1932, Oklaho-
ma case law has deemed an employee's actions to be within the scope of em-
ployment if the "acts are incidental to and in furtherance of"'43 the business of
the employer.'" Nail v. City of Henryetta'" held that "one acts within the
scope of employment if engaged in work assigned, or if doing that which is
proper, necessary and usual to accomplish the work assigned, or doing that
which is customary within the particular trade or business."'" The court in
Mistletoe Express v. Culp47 also "observed that in order for an employer to
be responsible for the tortuous acts of its employee, it must be shown that the
act giving rise to the complaint 'was done for the purpose of doing the work as-
signed.""'  Additionally, the court in Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Carsten'"
insisted that "'competent evidence" be presented to support "not only that the
relation of principal and agent existed but that the tortuous act was committed
in the course of the employment."'n"
In 1995, the court in Skinner v. Braums reiterated what has long been
considered a limit on the scope of employment:
139. Id.
140. 916 P.2d 1369 (Okla. 1996).
141. Id. at 1374 n.23 (citing Texaco v. Henricks, 395 P.2d at 396-97). See also Braden v. Hendricks, 695
P.2d 1343, 1352 (Okla. 1985); Elias v. Midwest Marble & Tile Co., 302 P.2d 126, 127-28 (Okla. 1956); Mid-
Continent Pipeline Co. v. Crauthers, 267 P.2d 568, 571 (Okla. 1954); World Pub. Co. v. Smith, 161 P.2d 861,
863 (Okla. 1945).
142. 21 P.2d 1 (Okla. 1932).
143. Winter, supra note 132, at 386.
144. See id. at 386 n.85.
145. 911 P.2d 914 (Okla. 1996).
146. Id. at 917. See also Roring, 326 P.2d at 812; Brayton v. Carter, 163 P.2d 960, 962 (Okla. 1945);
Retail Merchants Assoc. v. Peterman, 99 P.2d 130, 131-132 (Okla. 1940).
147. 353 P.2d 9 (Okla. 1959).
148. Id. at 16.
149. 55 P.2d 757 (Okla. 1936).
150. Id. See also Crews v. Garber, 73 P.2d 855 (Okla. 1937); Hill v. McQueen, 230 P.2d 483 (Okla.
195 1); Allison v. Gilmore, Gardner, & Kirk, Inc., 350 P.2d 287, 292 (Okla. 1960) (where the court held "[w]e
are impelled to conclude that there was nothing connected with the employment of the truck driver, King,
whose duties were to drive the truck of the defendant and deliver gasoline, that would warrant his fighting
with plaintiff and did not come within the scope of his employment!).
151. 890 P.2d 922 (Okla. 1995).
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[u]nder the 'going and coming' rule, an employee going to and from work
is ordinarily considered outside the scope of employment and the employ-
er is not liable for his/her torts. The rule is ascribed to the theory that the
employment relationship is suspended from the time the employee leaves
until he or she returns. During the commute, it is assumed that the "em-
ployee does not render a service to the employer.'
Also, the Mistletoe court reiterated the rule that "scope of employment must be
considered on an individual basis."'' In Empire Oil & Ref. Co. v. Fields,'54
the court stated that scope of employment was a question to be determined by
the jury. 55
3. Intentional torts
The doctrine of respondeat superior was expanded to encompass liability
for intentional torts committed by employees as early as 1932, with the Ada-
Konawa decision. 5 6 The employer in that case was held liable when his em-
ployee, a toll collector, intentionally shot the plaintiff for failure to pay the toll
to cross the bridge. The Court reasoned that it was the duty of the toll collector
to prevent use of the bridge without payment of the toll, thus, the shooting was
committed in the course of employment." 7 In contrast, in Jackson v.
Remington Park, Inc.,"5 the appellate court found no vicarious liability for the
defendant racetrack and no liability for negligent hiring or retaining of the
farrier who assaulted another in a dispute over a personal debt owed by the
victim.'59 Despite the fact that the incident occurred at the employee's
worksite, the racetrack had no actual knowledge that the farrier had any "dan-
gerous quality," and the motive for the assault was purely personal."W
In 1993, in Rodebush v. Oklahoma Nursing Homes, 6' the Oklahoma Su-
preme Court upheld a finding of vicarious liability against a nursing home
when a nurse aide slapped a patient who became combative while being
bathed. The employee's actions were held to be within the scope of em-
152. Id. at 924 n.7. See also Anderson v. Falcon Drilling Co., 695 P.2d 521, 524 (Okla. 1985); Haco
Drilling Co. v. Burchette, 364 P.2d 674, 677 (Okla. 1961) (recognizing the Elias rule "that a man's employ-
ment does iot begin until he has reached the place of his employment, and does not continue after he has
gone").
153. Id. at 15.
154. 73 P.2d 164, 167 (Okla. 1937).
155. See id. See also Skinner, 890 P.2d at 922 (where the court held that "issues of fact as to whether
employer instructed employee to obtain supplies on her way to work precluded summary judgment as to
whether employee was acting within scope of employment at time of accident'); Nail, 911 P.2d at 915 (where
the court held that "the question of whether the police officer was acting within the scope of his employment
when the appellee was injured is an issue for jury determination").
156. Ada-Konawa Bridge Co. v. Cargo, 21 P.2d 1 (Okla. 1932).
157. See id. at 7.
158. 874 P.2d 814 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994).
159. See id. at 816-17.
160. See id.
161. 867 P.2d 1241 (Okla. 1993).
162. See id. at 1243.
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ployment and incidental to his occupation as a nurse aide. 63 In that case, the
court acknowledged the general rule from Hill v. McQueen'" that "it is not
within the scope of an employee's employment to commit an assault upon a
third person," and that "scope of employment must be considered on an individ-
ual basis." '165 The court went on to state:
However, this general rule does not apply when the act is one which is
fairly and naturally incidental to the business .... [and is done] while the
servant was engaged upon the master's business[,] although mistakenly or
ill advisedly, with a view to further the master's interest, or from some
impulse of emotion which naturally grew out of or was incident to the
attempt to perform the master's business."
The court continued, further stating that "[ajn employee's act is within the
scope of employment if it is incident to some service being performed for the
employer or arises out of an emotional response to actions being taken for the
employer."'67
The court relied on the following facts in finding vicarious liability: the
plaintiff patient "was known to be particularly combative when being
bathed[;] '"' the aide "was carrying out an assigned task when the slapping
occurred[,]"' 69 and the aide apparently received inadequate training from his
employer.
The decision has been criticized 70 because the court's analysis failed to
consider, explicitly, whether the nature of the employment at issue was likely to
require the use of force and whether the employee's tortuous actions were rea-
sonably foreseeable by the employer.' If, as has been suggested, the
Rodebush decision is construed to mean that reasonable foreseeability is not a
prerequisite to finding an employer liable for an employee's actions, then the
scope of employment inquiry may, in the future, focus predominantly on where
and when the injury occurred."
C. Translation from corporate to nonprofit law
If nonprofit law is to follow corporate case law, two issues must be ad-
dressed. Volunteers differ from employees in two important ways: Volunteers
are not compensated, and nonprofits may not exercise the same degree of con-
trol over volunteers as employers exert over their paid employees.
There is case law that addresses the issue of whether vicarious liability
attaches when the servant was not entitled to compensation for work done at the
163. See id. at 1246.
164. 230 P.2d 483 (Okla. 1951).
165. Rodebush, 867 P.2d at 1245.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1246.
169. Id.
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time of the act causing injury. For example, the Roring court stated in its third
syllabus:
It is not essential to liability by the master that the servant be entitled to
compensation for the work at the time of the action causing the damage;
it is enough to render the master liable if the person causing the injury
was in fact rendering service for him by his consent, express or im-
plied.17
3
The right to control issue 74 with regard to volunteers has been dealt with
in other jurisdictions.175 It is usually found to exist in the "nature of the agree-
ment between the volunteer and the organization"'76 and where the organiza-
tion gives specific instructions to its volunteers.'n
Since Oklahoma's Volunteer Immunity Statute78 makes it clear that vi-
carious liability under respondeat superior applies to nonprofit corporations and
charitable organizations for the actions of their volunteers, it is expected that
these two issues will not act to bar recovery for parties injured by volunteers.
In summary, a nonprofit corporation faces liability in tort for the negli-
gence of its volunteers, provided that their "acts are incidental to and in further-
ance of' the organization's "business".'79 The "going and coming" rule pre-
cludes liability for actions occurring while traveling to and from the
worksite,W unless the individual is instructed or expected to do errands for
the organization while en route.' Liability for intentional torts attaches if the
act giving rise to the complaint "was done for the purpose of doing the work
assigned."'" After the Rodebush decision, it is unclear to what extent the be-
havior of the individual must be reasonably foreseeable to the organization.'
83
173. Ro ing, 326 P.2d at 812.
174. See supra text and accompanying notes 132-39.
175. See, e.g., Trinity Lutheran Church v. Miller, 451 N.E.2d 1099 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Baxter v.
Momingside, Inc., 521 P.2d 946 (Wash. App. 1974); Wilson v. The Boy Scouts of America, 989 F.2d 953
(8th Cir. 1993).
176. Kahn, supra note 1, at 1440 n. 46 The Restatement (Second) of Agency states that "[olne who vol-
unteers services without an agreement for or expectation of reward may be a servant of the one accepting
such services.... ." This statement has been relied on extensively by courts in finding a master-servant rela-
tionship when there is no salary or other payment to the servant. RESTATEmENr (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 255
(1957).
. 177. See Kahn, supra note 1, at 1441 n49. See, e.g., Trinity, 451 N.E.2d at 1102-03 (when an organiza-
tion directs the way in which a volunteer performs a task, even if the volunteer does not assent, the right to
control may be established by the volunteer actually following the proffered instructions); Manor v. Hanson,
356 N.W.2d 925, 926 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1984) (organization found to be master of volunteer driver even though
it had never met with the driver after the initial orientation and had not control over the volunteer's schedule).
178. OKLA. STAT. tit. 76, § 31 (Supp. 1995).
179. Ada, 21 P.2d at 7.
180. See Elias, 302 P.2d at 126.
181. See Haco, 364 P.2d at 677.
182. Rodebush, 867 P.2d at 1246.
183. See Winter, supra note 132.
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D. Tort reform
Tort reforms enacted by Oklahoma's forty-fifth legislature address the
issues of vicarious and personal liability of volunteers and nonprofits, as well as
providing new caps on punitive damages and a new offer of judgment proce-
dure." These changes went into effect August 25, 1995, but as no cases have
been decided since then, it is impossible to predict accurately how they will be
interpreted by the Oklahoma courts. To date, the Oklahoma judiciary has not
been called upon to decide the issue of vicarious liability with regard to volun-
teers and nonprofits. In fact, little case law exists in any jurisdiction regarding
this issue" or the application of statutory immunity to volunteers.'86
1. Offer of judgment
Oklahoma's 1995 Tort Reform Law' also codified a new offer of judg-
ment procedure.' If a nonprofit is sued for personal injury or wrongful death
and makes an offer to settle, a rejection potentially incurs consequences for the
plaintiff. Even if he or she prevails at trial, unless awarded more than the settle-
ment offer, the plaintiff will be subject to paying the defendant corporation's
attorney fees and litigation costs incurred after the settlement offer was made.
The new procedure differs from the section it supersedes in that it authorizes
recovery of attorney fees and costs."9 Likewise, rejection of a counteroffer
made by the plaintiff may shift the plaintiff's costs to the defendant."9 This
type of procedure has also been called a "loser pays" provision.'"
Oklahoma's version has come under criticism from the 1995 Chair of the
Civil Procedure Committee of the Oklahoma Bar Association," to wit,
If an offer of judgment procedure was intended to weed out frivolous tort
cases, it is apparent that it will not succeed, because the procedure will
apply only if the defendant makes an offer of judgment for more than
$100,000. Obviously, no defendant would offer $100,000 to settle a frivo-
lous case.'93
It remains to be seen how much this new offer of judgment provision will
be used. The previous procedure in section 1101 does not appear to have been
used a great deal, judging by the small number of reported decisions listed
under the section in the Oklahoma Statutes Annotated. The availability of attor-
ney fees may increase the use of the offer of judgment procedure somewhat,
184. See 1995 Okla. Sess. Laws 287.
185. See Kahn, supra note 1, at 1433.
186. See Jones v. Westemaires, Inc., 876 P. 2d 50 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993).
187. 1995 Okla. Sess. Laws 287.
188. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1101.1(A) (Supp. 1995).
189. See Adams, supra note 105, at 755.
190. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1101.1(A)(3) (Supp. 1995).
191. See Chuck Ervin, House, Senate Pass Tort Reform, TULSA WORLD, 1995 WL 5596615 (May 24,
1995).
192. See Adams, supra note 105, at 763.
193. Id. at 754.
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but other states with similar procedures, such as Florida, Indiana, and Nevada,
did not see a deluge of offers of judgment after their statutes were adopted. 4
2. Punitive damages
Punitive damages have been traditionally allowable for conduct that rises
to the level of gross negligence or willful and wanton disregard for the rights of
others. Oklahoma's 1995 Tort Reform Law19 creates a three-tier system for
punitive damages."9 The punitive damages statutory change imposes a higher
evidentiary standard in personal injury cases, allowing a "clear and convincing"
standard to replace the former "preponderance of the evidence" standard. It caps
punitive damages based on the degree of culpability of the defendant's behav-
ior. For actions found to be in "reckless disregard," punitive damages are
capped at "$100,000 or the amount of actual damages, whichever is greater." If
the jury finds the defendant acted intentionally and with malice, the punitive
damages awarded cannot exceed "$500,000, twice the amount of the actual
damages awarded, or the amount of the financial benefit to the defendant,
whichever is greater." And, if the judge also makes a finding, "beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, that a defendant acted intentionally and with malice in conduct
that was life-threatening," there is no cap."
"In some ways, the new statute is more restrictive with respect to punitive
damages than the prior statute, but punitive damages may also be greater in
many circumstances under the new statute than they would have been under the
prior statute."'98 The punitive damage statute has been criticized out of con-
cern that it will have a "chilling effect on people with legitimate complaints and
discourage them from seeking justice in the courts, for fear they will be stuck
with legal costs they cannot pay.' 99
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NONPROFITS
A. Volunteers
Volunteers are the workforce of nonprofit corporations, and it seems every-
one benefits from the nonprofit-volunteer relationship. But its equally true that
volunteers can be a source of exposure to tort liability. The actions of volun-
teers can harm people, completely unintentionally, and the corporation may
very well have to pay for the consequences. Hence, if nonprofit corporations are
to be held liable under the control theory, they should develop the degree of
control over their volunteers that the law presumes to exist.'
194. Id. at 758.
195. 1995 Okla. Sess. Laws 287.
196. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 9.1 (Supp. 1995).
197. See Ervin, supra note 191.
198. See Adams, supra note 105, at 761.
199. Id. at 761. See also Ervin, supra note 191 ("Senator Gene Stipe said the bill primarily is designed to
protect big corporations who kill innocent people because of wanton disregard for their safety.").
200. See Kahn, supra note 1, at 1443 & n.64.
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TORT LIABILITY OF NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS
Efforts to exercise effective control over the actions of volunteers start
with a clear written statement of the organization's mission and purposes and a
job description for each duty and for each individual volunteer. Defining and
committing these to writing' defines the "scope of the official functions and
duties of a volunteer" and makes clear both parties' expectations.' Policy
and procedure manuals should be available, clear, and up-to-date at all times.
"[The non-profit organization can be held liable for improper selection,
assignment, training and supervision of volunteers. The greatest area of liability
concerns the failure to act upon notice of some wrongdoing or inadequacy of a
volunteer." 3 The temperament, education and skills, as well as the criminal
background of each volunteer bears investigation. Nonprofits have a duty to
exercise care in managing their volunteers, particularly when they will interact
with the public. Proper training is an important step toward assuring safe activi-
ties, controlling the volunteer's actions, and predicting his or her behavior.
Supervising volunteers may be more problematic than supervising compensated
employees because of the reduced impact of the threat of termination, the lack
of the "gratitude factor" of compensated employees, and the variability of
volunteers' time schedules and work sites.' Nonetheless, the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior, which imposes liability on nonprofits for the actions of their
volunteers, turns on whether the volunteer was acting in the "scope" of his or
her role at the time of injury and the organizations' duty of care with regard to
its exercise of authority over its "servants."
B. Directors and Officers
Directors and officers provide leadership to nonprofit organizations for a
variety of personal and altruistic reasons. The service of competent and energet-
ic people is invaluable to these organizations, and must be encouraged. But
public-minded service carries with it legal obligations to be accountable to the
community for the risks created by the activities engaged in and to the organi-
zation to maximize the productivity of limited resources and to minimize the
associated risks and costs. The interests of providing public benefits and pro-
tecting the safety and well-being of the beneficiaries of an organization's activi-
ties must be balanced by the board of directors and its officers.25
As a means of relieving the "potential legal liabilities that board members
fear,'9M it has been suggested that nonprofit corporations adopt a bifurcated
board of directors: A board of director-managers responsible for day-to-day
management and a board of advisors to supervise and oversee the management
201. See McMenamin, supra note 24, at 17-18.
202. Id. at 18.
203. Id.
204. See Kahn, supra note 1, at 1445.
205. See FismAN & ScHwAxz, supra note 19, at 151.
206. James J. Fishman, The Development Of Nonprofit Corporation Law And An Agenda For Reform, 34
EMORY L. 617, 683 (1985).
1997]
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board.' This approach places the advisory board in a better position to pro-
vide oversight to ensure that public responsibilities are met, to anticipate future
problems more readily, and to focus on long range goals and planning. The
managing board, the kind most commonly in place in nonprofits today, is left
with a more manageable workload, allowing more efficient and effective use of
the limited time and energy resources of volunteer directors and officers upon
whom nonprofits depend for their on-going management.
Members of boards of directors must exercise reasonable diligence and
care in carrying out their duties for the nonprofit organizations they serve. The
test of whether their efforts are adequate turns on their acting in good faith. In
order to perform their duties in good faith, using the appropriate standard of
care, directors and officers should make efforts to stay informed about their
organization's activities by conscientiously attending meetings and by learning
and understanding their duties as leaders of their organizations. When they
disagree with board decisions and actions, they should speak out and register
their dissent to avoid incurring personal liability for those acts. It is the respon-
sibility of each board member to avoid self-dealing, to know and obey relevant
statutes, and to seek and rely on legal counsel.'
VII. CONCLUSION
Nonprofit corporations and the volunteers engaged in their service are vital
to Oklahomans and to all Americans. The threat of tort liability exposure im-
pinges on the organizations' viability and impedes the altruistic expression of
millions of volunteers in this country. Recent tort reform efforts in Oklahoma
clarified the issue for volunteers by granting them immunity from personal
liability as long as they act in good faith, within the scope of their official
functions and duties, and do not cause damage or injury by gross negligence or
willful and wanton misconduct.' Uncompensated members of the boards of
directors of these organizations enjoy similar protection from liability, both for
their own actions and for the actions of employees and other directors of the
nonprofit corporation.
Respondeat superior is specifically invoked by Oklahoma's Volunteer
Immunity Statute.210 Thus, the corporation itself bears the brunt of respon-
sibility for those who act for it on a voluntary basis, at least until the courts
decide otherwise. As a result, volunteers can breathe easier as they engage in
volunteer activities of their choosing. However, nonprofit corporations have to
wonder about the scope of their vicarious liability and the extent of potential
tort liability costs in the future.
Brenda Kimery
207. See id. at 679.
208. See Engel, supra note 94, at 29-30.
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